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Lockheed Aircraft Corporation was a financially sound organization
during the mid 1960s with a reputation as a leader in the aerospace
industry. Long term debt for the corporation amounted to only $17
million in 1966 and was supported by stockholders' equity of $318
million. Lockheed incurred substantial losses in 1969 and 1970 on
four major defense contracts. The company was also have financial
difficulty with their latest commercial venture. In 1971 the company
claimed that it faced bankruptcy unless the government would provide
loan guarantees in order to enable them to obtain additional capital.
By the end of 1972, long term debt was over $760 million with
stockholders' equity of $266 million.
This thesis consists of case studies which trace the decline of
Lockheed through 1972. Major projects which contributed to the
decline, such as the C-5A, the Cheyenne helicopter and the L-1011




I. INTRODUCTION - - 6
H. LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: TPP CASE — 8
A. BACKGROUND -'- - 8
B. THE C-5A CONTRACT—- 9
C. CONTRACT PROVISIONS 10
D. C-5A PROBLEM AREAS — 12
E. THE CHEYENNE HELICOPTER PROGRAM-- 18
F. THE SRAM PROGRAM 21
G. THE SHIP CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM—— 22
H. CONCLUSION - 22
in. LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: CAPITAL CASE 32
A. THE SITUATION 32
B. LOCKHEED OPERATIONS, 1967-1969 -- 33
C. LOCKHEED OPERATIONS, 1970 AND 1971- -- 34
D. LOCKHEED OPERATIONS, 1972--- 38
E. LOCKHEED"S FUTURE? 39
APPENDIX A LOCKHEED FINANCIAL DATA 44
BIBLIOGRAPHY 49
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 51

I. INTRODUCTION
In May 1971 legislation which became known as the Emergency Loan
Guarantee Act was introduced before Congress. The avowed purpose
of this legislation was to provide Federal guarantees for loans to
major U. S. corporations have serious financial difficulties. It was
widely believed to be specifically aimed toward rescuing the nation's
number one defense contractor Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, from
bankruptcy. Published information on the operations of Lockheed
over the past decade provides an abundance of material. This infor-
mation traces the decline of this giant aerospace corporation from the
position of an industry leader in the mid 1960s to near bankruptcy in
the early 1970s.
This thesis consists of a series of case studies centered around
Lockheed's involvement in defense contracts awarded to the company
under the concept known as "total package procurement. " The cases
also include Lockheed's latest entry into the commercial transport
field, the L-1011, and outline the financial decline of the company
from 1964 to the end of 1974. These cases are the result of an interest
by Professor Leslie Darbyshire in developing material for use in the
Financial Management courses at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Professor Darbyshire spent several months researching available
published sources on the past operations of Lockheed. In December
1973, the author accepted Professor Darbyshire's offer to sponsor
development of the Lockheed cases as a thesis project. Additional

research was conducted to extend the coverage of the available
material and to provide information on events which, although
external to Lockheed, impacted upon company operations.
All information contained in these cases has been prepared from
publicly available sources. Specific references to footnotes have
been eliminated to facilitate classroom use of the cases.

H T.OCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION:
~ TPP CAiStl
A. BACKGROUND
During the spring of 1965, three leading corporations
in the
aerospace industry were busily engaged in preparing bids
for submission
on a multibillion dollar defense project. This project was
the develop-
ment, production and partial support of the Air Force
C-5A heavy
logistic transport. The winner of the contract to build
the world's
largest aircraft could expect, in addition to contractual
profits or
losses, to gain a substantial edge in the future
air-transport business.
The three competitors for the airframe contract,
Lockheed, Douglas
and Boeing, were each subsidized by the Air Force with $6
million
to aid in preparing their submissions. With the
possibility of profits
ranging in the $200 million area, each company had invested
approximately $20 million of its own capital.
The bids were submitted in April to the Source Selection
Board
consisting of four Air Force generals with a staff of
over five hundred
specialists. After intensive review, there was a
major split in
opinions regarding the Lockheed and Boeing submissions.
The Source
Selection Board favored the superior performance of the
Boeing
proposal while higher authority was attracted by the
significantly
lower price offered by Lockheed. The Douglas
submission had been
ruled out on both counts. The Lockheed proposal had
underbid Boeing
by $300 million and, in the end, the dollar prevailed.
In October,




Lockheed-Georgia vice president and C-5A program manager,
The learning experience on the C-130 and C-141 has been
projected forward. We did a good job on the C-130 and a better
job on the C-141. We are continuing the improvement curve on
the C-5A. We really didn't price on what we've done in the past,
but on what we intend to do in the future. . . . The learning curve
did put us in a relatively good position. . . . We (also) wanted this
program pretty badly and we sharpened our pencil pretty well.
Lockheed was optimistic about the future of the C-5A and estimated
the total market potential at 300 aircraft, 100 of which would be
a civilian version.
B. THE C-5A CONTRACT
The C-5A contract was unique. It was the first contract awarded
under the "total package procurement" concept, known as TPP. TPP
was introduced by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara in an
effort to reduce defense spending. It was intended primarily for
state-of-the-art projects that would not require a breakthrough in
technology. Prior to this time, most defense contracts were let
in two stages. A research/development/prototype contract was
awarded first and the production contract, second. The winner of the
R&D contract was almost virtually assured of the follow-on contract
because of technical expertise acquired during development. This
encouraged the practice of "buying-in, " that is, bidding low on a
fixed price R&D contract while planning to recoup any losses incurred
on it during the subsequent production phase. TPP was designed to
discourage this practice and was to replace many cost-plus programs,
where the incentive to hold down costs was lacking.
Under TPP, a contractor was required to submit a fixed price
bid to cover the entire program. In the case of the C-5A, this was

for a period of eight years. The contractor was to be held responsible
for all system specification, performance and milestones, such as
first test flight and delivery dates. The fixed contract price for the
C-5A contained a target cost plus a profit of 10%. In addition, a
ceiling price was set at approximately 130% of the target cost. The
ceiling price was the maximum amount, after adjustments for economic
fluctuations, that the government was obligated to spend on the entire
program. Exhibit 1 contains a simplified breakdown of the Lockheed
submission.
EXHIBIT 1
C-5A Target Costs, Profits, Target and Ceiling Prices
($ In Millions)
Target Target Target Ceiling
Cost Profit Price Price
R&D + Run "A" $1,280 $128 $1,408 $1,664
Run "B" 494 49 543 642
Total $1,774 $177 $1,951 $2,306
C. CONTRACT PROVISIONS
The program was divided into two major sections. First,
Production Run A required the company to develop and evaluate five
test platforms. These five aircraft would later be reconfigured to
Air Force specifications for operational use. An additional 53 aircraft
were included in Run A. Production Run B was an option for 57
aircraft that could be ordered at the discretion of the Air Force,
subject to congressional funding. This option, if desired, was to be
exercised two years prior to the first scheduled delivery date.
10

The C-5A contract contained a controversial provision known as
the "repricing formula" by those who defended it and as the "golden
handshake" by critics. (The repricing formula, options and other
adjustments were offered in identical form to all competitors.
)
The formula would come into effect only if the option for Production
Run B was exercised. To become fully effective, the Air Force
needed to purchase at least 32 of the 57 Run B aircraft. Any lesser
amount would significantly blunt the impact of the repricing formula.
In the event of cost overruns and if the option for Run B was not
exercised, Lockheed was to pay 30% of costs exceeding the target
cost up to the ceiling price. Lockheed's share of the cost overruns
was to be deducted from the Run A target profit of $128 million. Any
costs in excess of the ceiling price would be paid for by Lockheed.
If Run B was ordered, and cost overruns on Run A exceeded 140% of
the Run A target cost, the repricing formula came into effect.
The repricing formula for Run B was worked out on a computer
and virtually requires a computer to understand. If actual,
audited costs of Run A exceed 140. 5 percent of the Run A target
costs, the excess percentage over 130 percent will be multiplied
by two. The resulting percentage figure will be used to multiply
the target cost and ceiling price of Run B as established in the
original contract.
The resultant product would then be added to the original target cost
and ceiling price to set new amounts for Run B. Critics of the formula
estimated that, if a contractor was sure that Run B would be ordered,
it would be possible to run up astronomical losses during Run A and
end up with a net profit through the repricing of Run B.
11

D. C-5A PROBLEM AREAS
Lockheed's problems commenced early in the development phase.
Several major technical changes had been inserted in the contract
proposal at the last minute. The company underestimated the costs
of the changes and the amount of time required for redesign work.
The biggest change had been an increase in the size of the wing area
in order to meet runway criteria imposed by the Air Force. Increasing
the wing area significantly increased aircraft weight and resulted in
more rounds of design work. Costs began rising. In an effort to
obtain relief, the company requested the C-5A System Program
Office (SPO) to make a trade-off between aircraft weight and engine
power. This request would have required General Electric, the prime
engine contractor, to increase engine performance at governmental
expense. The SPO refused. Lockheed was forced to go to exotic and
expensive metals, such as titanium and beryllium, in the effort to
minimize weight.
The company's initial concept of the C-5A was a scaled-up
version of the C-141. This proved not to be the case, however, as
the sheer physical size of the giant aircraft created many complex
problems that were expensive to correct. Costs continued to increase
and, by the end of 1966, many key items in the development phase
had been overrun by more than 100%
Lockheed moved into production in 1967 with many technical
problems unresolved. The lead time required to obtain basic
materials and components had averaged ten weeks when the contract
was awarded. During the production phase, the same items required
12

from 16-20 weeks of lead time. (See Exhibit 2.) The increase in
EXHIBIT 2


















1965 1966 1967 1968
lead time resulted from two basic causes. First was the rapid
escalation of the Vietnam conflict, with the concurrent requirement
for military equipment. The second was the dramatic increase in
the demand for commercial aircraft during 1964-1967. The 1964
value of backlog orders in the aerospace industry was $8 billion, with
the military accounting for almost 70% of the total. By 1967 the
backlog amounted to $21 billion, with the military share at 40%. Again
Lockheed contacted the SPO in an effort to have milestone dates
relaxed. Under the terms of the contract, the company could be
assessed up to $11 million for late deliveries. Again the SPO stood
firm. To obtain critical lead time items, the company had to pay
premium prices and resorted to excessive overtime to keep the aircraft
13

on schedule. Prior to the era of TPP, "contract nourishment" had
been a common practice in defense contracting. Under this practice,
contract specifications were often relaxed or enough contract change
orders were issued to ensure that the contractor did not fare badly.
Never before had the terms of a contract been so rigidly enforced.
In their 1969 report to stockholders the company noted that,
Contract terms were regarded as sacrosant even though a
relaxation of specifications and delivery dates could have greatly
lessened costs.
The inflexibility of the SPO was not Lockheed's only problem.
In preparing their submissions, all contractors had been warned to
carefully consider the consequences of economic trends for the first
two years of the contract. On 1 January 1968 an economic fluctuation
clause was to become effective. This clause was designed to protect
the contractor in the event of abnormal inflation and the government
in case of a recession. The clause included no provision for increasing
or decreasing profits. In essence the clause provided for normalcy
bands centered on straight line projections of four cost indexes.
Lacking any insight into the future, both Lockheed and the government
assumed that the trends exhibited during the base period, 1960-1964,
would continue and be within the normalcy band in 1968. Almost
immediately after Lockheed was awarded the contract, the country
entered a period of abnormal inflation. The cost indexes began
rising at twice the rate exhibited during the base period. Exhibits 3
through 6 show the normalcy bands, the actual trends through June
1969 and the Lockheed Projections through 1973. hi 1969, Lockheed
estimated that the total cost increase duo to abnormal inflation would
14






















































1 I 1 1 I I L








































target cost and ceiling price adjustment of only $171 million due to the




Adding to Lockheed's troubles was alledged inefficiency on the
production line. One supervisor noted that,
He had 40 more men in his department than he needed; that he
was getting about six hours work out of eight hours; that when he
went to ten hours and over, the production dropped to five hours.
He knew personally of two cases where the individual was making
ten dollars an hour, did not have a degree, was not doing anything,
and yet spent sixty hours a week doing it because that was what
the contract called for. This can be multiplied by many hundreds
of times.
Although it was known that the company was facing cost overruns
on the C-5A program, the magnitude of the overruns was not general
knowledge. Early in 1968 the SPO became aware that costs were
approximately $1 billion above the target cost of $1. 28 billion. The
SPO did not make this information available because of "security
considerations. " Knowing that the company was facing a large
monetary loss, the SPO feared that public disclosure could have an
adverse effect on the stock market and Lockheed's liquidity position,
In the meantime, Lockheed was presenting a low profile on the cost
situation. With the Air Force due to exercise the Run B option early
in 1969, the company was not anxious to reveal the true cost picture.
In November however, A. E. Fitzgerald, a deputy assistant secretary
of the Air Force, appeared before a congressional hearing. His
testimony indicated that cost overruns for Run A would reach at least
100%. Despite unfavorable publicity and political pressures, the
Air Force exercised the option for Production Run B in January 1969.
In November of the same year, the option for Run B was unilaterally
amended by the Air Force to place a final order for 23 aircraft due
to "budgetary constraints. "
17

E. THE CHEYENNE HELICOPTER PROGRAM
The contract for the AH-56A Cheyenne helicopter was the second
defense contract awarded under TPP. A new concept in helicopters,
the rigid-rotor, was to be incorporated into the Cheyenne development.
The rigid-rotor was designed to eliminate stability problems inherent
to hovering aircraft and was to provide the Cheyenne with a top
airspeed twice that of conventional helicopters. During the late
fifties and early sixties Lockheed had developed, with their own
capital, a small rigid-rotor system. It had been installed in a small
helicopter and had been certified by the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration. This technological edge was largely responsible for Lockheed
being awarded the Cheyenne contract in March 1966 over established
helicopter companies. Lockheed had also submitted the lowest bid.
The contract called for the development and testing of 10 prototype
aircraft. Production options were attached to the contract, setting
fixed prices for 375, 500, 1,000, and 1,500 planes. If the production
option was not exercised by the Army prior to the end of 1967, the
contract would expire and the fixed prices renegotiated.
Lockheed was beginning to experience the technology problems
related to scaling up the C-5A from a smaller aircraft at the same
time as the contract negotiations for the Cheyenne. In spite of these
difficulties Lockheed was confident that similar problems would not
occur with the Cheyenne. Lockheed was so optimistic that they
negotiated a ceiling price for the program" of only 115% of the target
cost. The comparable figure was 130% for the C-5A.
18

The Cheyenne program encountered the same basic difficulties
as the C-5A. Increased lead times required the company to pay
premium prices to keep the aircraft on schedule. The rigid-rotor
did not work as predicted and required expensive redesign work. By
the end of 1967, development costs had exceeded the ceiling price of
$96 million by over $50 million. This excess had come out of
Lockheed's pocket, as the Army would only authorize progress
payments up to the ceiling price. The Army was late in exercising
the production run option. Despite the problems encountered and
rising costs, the Army issued a letter of intent in January 1968 for
the production of 375 aircraft. The production contract, for almost
$875 million, was double the original cost estimates. It was aircraft
performance however, not cost, that led to the demise of the
Cheyenne.
The program moved into development with technical problems
unresolved and the development effort continuing. As time passed,
the main problems that eluded correction were instability at high
speeds, a cruise speed 10 miles per hour below contract specifications,
handling characteristics during sidewise flight and rotor oscillations
that led to a crash and the death of the test pilot.
Lockheed made several tactical errors in dealing with the Army.
In gaining permission to build the Cheyenne, the Army had won an
unusual victory over the Air Force. Close ground support, the
primary mission of the Cheyenne, fell under the auspices of the
Air Force, Lockheed assumed that the Army would take no action that
would jeopardize their parochial victory. The Army was unfamiliar
19

with the aerospace industry. They were concerned with Lockheed's
handling of the technical problems and the increasing publicity centered
on cost overruns. The company did not make a concerted effort to
convince the Army that these difficulties were normal in a new weapons
system. In March 1969 the crash caused by rotor vibrations occurred.
The Army had had enough and issued a public "cure notice" to
Lockheed in April. This notice listed all discrepancies of the program
and gave the company less than three weeks to come up with a formal
correction to each problem. Lockheed responded to the cure notice
with an around-the-clock effort. Within the time alloted, the company
was able to prepare an answer for the Army. This answer listed in
detail exactly how the company planned to correct each problem. The
Army was still not convinced that the Cheyenne could be built to
specifications on schedule. The Army notified Lockheed, by way
of a press release, that the contract was being terminated for default.
Lockheed officials were amazed. Said Daniel Haughton:
If they wanted to terminate, they should have terminated for
convenience, not default. My goodnessl You don't make quantum
jumps in technology without encountering problems.
Lockheed had expended $98 million on Cheyenne production while
receiving $54 million in progress payments. Under termination for
default, Lockheed would be required to refund all progress payments.
A termination for the government's convenience would allow the
company to recoup all production and termination expenses. Lockheed
submitted the issue to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
for arabitration. Lockheed insisted that the Cheyenne had met 90%




F. THE SRAM PROGRAM
The SRAM propulsion unit was Lockheed's third and last involve-
ment under TPP. Although the SRAM contract was the smallest of
the three TPP programs, it was to present the most complex challenge
in terms of technology. Ten days before contract proposals were to
be submitted, the Air Force increased SRAM performance specifications
by 30%. With true Lockheed optimism, the company responded to the
challenge. The company prepared new designs in which it made many
assumptions. Lockheed did not have the time required to test and
evaluate their proposals adequately and informed the Air Force of
this fact.
In November 1966, Lockheed was awarded the SRAM motor
contract, worth $17 million, with their proposed design on paper
only. The theories that Lockheed had hastily prepared did not prove
workable. Redesign work and the development of a propellant capable
of meeting Air Force specifications escalated the cost rapidly.
Although all of the problems were eventually solved, the Air Force
did not exercise the production option because of other defects in the
rocket assembly. By the end of 1969, costs had exceeded the ceiling
price by $30 million and were still rising. The company submitted a
claim in excess of $50- million to the Air Force. Justification of the
claim was based on the premise that the SRAM motor was not a state-




G. THE SHIP CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
The Navy shipbuilding programs were not TPP contracts. The
program consisted of nine separate contracts awarded to Lockheed
throughout the 1960s. Each of the contracts had experienced cost
overruns due to Navy-initiated changes, work stoppages and other
unforeseen difficulties. By the end of 1969 Lockheed had submitted
claims to the government totaling $175 million on the various ship
contracts. In reporting the status of these claims to the stockholders
in early 1970, Mr. Haughton noted:
The bulk of the U. S. shipbuilding industry has encountered
comparable grave troubles on similar Navy ship construction, as
indicated by more than a billion dollars in contract claims. This
suggests that the procurement system, rather than solely individual
deficiencies, has been a major contributor to this problem.
H. CONCLUSION
Lockheed moved into 1970 in poor financial health. Adding to the
military problems were funding difficulties for their L-1011 air bus.
The L-1011 was a Lockheed venture to recapture a portion of the
civilian business of the aerospace industry. In 1969 the company
obtained an unsecured line of credit from a banking consortium for
$400 million. By early 1970 the line of credit, intended to finance
the L-1011, had been drawn down by $320 million. Of that amount,
$170 million had been diverted from the L-1011 program to fund the
foundering military programs. The company was working with the
banking community in an effort to increase the company's line of credit.
The company was successful; however, the bankers were becoming
increasingly nervous about Lockheed's financial plight. The line of
credit was restructured to $500 million. Of this amount, only
22

$30 million additional was available to Lockheed. The remaining
$150 million would be made available to the company after they had
Settled the military contract disputes with the government.
In March 1970, Lockheed concluded that they were overextended.
Capital to support the military programs and the L-1011 would not be
available for existing funds and projected income past the end of
the year. In short, Lockheed was on the verge of bankruptcy. In
a desperate attempt to raise funds, Lockheed turned to the Department
of Defense. In a letter to Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard,
Mr. Haughton requested $650 million in immediate funds, pending
settlement of the military contracts.
Lockheed received a formal answer in the form of a letter
from Mr. Packard to the Senate Armed Services Committee. (See
Exhibit 7.) Relevant financial data for the Lockheed Aircraft










Attached ia a copy of my letter of 30 December 1970 to the Chairman
of the Senate Armed Services Committee which outlines the plan of
action which I have proposed to the Congress to resolve the contractual
difficulties between the government and the Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation. A similar letter has been forwarded to the Chairman of
the House Armed Services Committee.
This plan, which I discussed by telephone with you recently, outlines
the alternatives available for the C-5A program and proposes a course
of action to settle the disputes on the Cheyenne program.
I would appreciate your comments on this plan and the alternative you
prefer to resolve the C-5A controversy. You, of course, understand












Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
As you know, on March 2, 1970, Mr. Daniel Haughton, Chairman of
the Board of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, submitted a letter to the
Department of Defense citing his company's contractual and financial
problems on four major defense programs: Navy shipbuilding, the
SRAM Missile Motor, the Cheyenne helicopter, and the C-5A.
Mr. Haughton's letter asserted that the "unprecedented dollar magnitude"
of the claims and disputes in which these programs were then involved
would "make it financially impossible for Lockheed to complete perform-
ance of these programs if we must await the outcome of litigation before
receiving further financing from the Department of Defense. " Mr.
Haughton emphasized the urgent need for a settlement, or for some
viable alternative to our procedure of requiring a contractor to continue
performance with its own financing during resolution of disputed matters.
Immediately upon receiving this letter, the Department of Defense under-
took an intensive independent determination of the nature and magnitude
of the managerial and financial problems presented by Mr. Haughton's
letter. Each of the military departments undertook to negotiate
settlements of their individual programs. My staff compiled and analyzed
data relating to the total corporate entity, including corporate financial
forecasts prepared by Lockheed at our request and audited by the Defense
Contract Audit Agency. It was necessary to determine the financial
viability of the corporation and to examine the availability of commercial
credit to meet the company's obligations.
Of utmost importance was our need to assure the continued availability
of weapons systems urgently needed for our national security. Several
programs for which Lockheed Aircraft Corporation is a contractor
with the Department of Defense are particularly critical to the nation's
defense.
These include the Poseidon missile system, the S-3A aircraft, the
Cheyenne helicopter, and the C-5A aircraft. In addition, it clearly
is in the vital national defense interest that the Navy ships currently




The time has now come when we must move promptly toward a settle-
ment of Lockheed- DoD contract disputes at minimum cost to the
U. S. Government and with minimum impact on third parties such
as Lockheed employees, suppliers, subcontractors and their employees.
It is my responsibility as Deputy Secretary of Defense to seek and to
find a solution. I have learned over the years that prolonged
procrastination in the face of a difficult problem is an unsatisfactory
stance that too often brings not solutions but added problems. Nothing
is to be gained by wishing that these problems which arose in the past
would go away; instead we must face present facts and move on to
future needs. I therefore wish to present to you, as I promised to do,
my plan to resolve these disputes.
To briefly recap, the defense contracts which have contributed to
Lockheed's financial problem were executed before this administration
took office. The C-5A contract was awarded to Lockheed in October
1965. The supplemental agreement to the contract, which committed
funds for 23 additional aircraft and which is claimed by Lockheed to
have exercised an option for 57 aircraft, was entered into during the
last week of the previous administration. It is the principal dispute
over the C-5A contract.
The contract for development of the AH-56A (Cheyenne) was awarded
by the Army to Lockheed in March 1966. It contained an option for
production quantities which was exercised in January 1968.
The contract for SRAM missile development was awarded to Boeing
in November 1966, with Lockheed participating as the subcontractor
for the rocket motor.
The nine Navy ship contracts out of which Lockheed's claims arose
were awarded to Lockheed from 1961 through 1965.
Shortly after taking office in January 1969. Secretary Laird and I became
aware of the difficulties being encountered on these programs. In fact,
the problems we found in connection with these programs led to re-
examination of and changes in the weapons acquisition process to bring
both technical and cost problems under better control.
We re-evaluated operational requirements and looked at the C-5A cost
growth in view of our budgetary constraints and decided not to extend
that program beyond the 81 aircraft on order. Because of unresolved
technical problems and a general failure to make progress, we made
the decision to terminate the Cheyenne production contract for default.
On the SRAM, we responded to technical and cost problems in develop-
ment by not exercising our option for production and by continuing the
emphasis on testing and development.
Since last March we have been working a virtually daily basis on
resolution of these Lockheed claims and disputes. Numerous discussions
also have been held with the banking community on future financing
needs of the corporation.
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Our review established that normal procedures for resolving these
disputes would require an extended period of time for which Lockheed
would have insufficient cash and inadequate commercial credit to
finance the continued operation of vital defense programs. We also
found that without the provision of additional funds by the Department
of Defense and without continued bank support, bankruptcy of the
Lockheed Corporation was and is inevitable. It was then necessary
to determine whether bankruptcy and corporate reorganization under
the Bankruptcy Act was or was not in the interest of national defense.
We found that while such bankruptcy proceedings would, if instituted,
primarily apply to Lockheed, that company's operations are so entwined
with many other companies which also contribute to our national defense
effort that it was necessary for us to consider the chain reaction upon
other companies as well. Based on extensive discussions with bankers
and other defense contractors, I have concluded that the consequences
of Lockheed bankruptcy at this time would be so far-reaching that
several other defense suppliers would be placed in such a precarious
financial condition that their capability for future operations would be
jeopardized. Further, several senior members of the banking
community have advised me that bankruptcy of Lockheed now would
cause them to reassess their credit agreements with many other
companies which supply essential defense equipment.
The exact ramifications of a bankruptcy proceeding remain uncertain,
but, in my judgment, the potential consequences are of such a grave
nature that all reasonable steps should be taken to avoid precipitating
a bankruptcy by our actions on defense programs. In the event of
Lockheed's bankruptcy the Department of Defense would be faced with
substantial uncertainties and risks about the degree to which several
key national defense programs would or could be continued. Decisions
on such matters would be subject to the discretion of the bankruptcy
court, which would be required to take into consideration the interests
of all creditors of the corporation. Serious delays would necessarily
ensue. At a minimum, it is almost certain that an accommodation
would have to be reached with the bankruptcy court to arrange to
continue performance of the C-5A contract, amoung others, and I see
no way which such an accommodation would enable the Department of
Defense to obtain the C-5A and other needed equipment at a cost lower
than under the course I am recommending.
With this background on the disputes and my judgment regarding
bankruptcy, I want to provide the Committee my plan.
I want to make it quite clear in presenting this plan that, while we have
had access to extensive financial data prepared by Lockheed and audited
by the DCAA, we have only recently received Lockheed's current formal
financial submittals. The plan I am proposing, therefore, is contingent
upon Lockheed's being completely responsive to oar continuing data
requirements and our satisfactory analysis and audit of the data submitted.
I have concluded that our normal, established procedures are adequate
to resolve two of the four issues.
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On the SRAM, for which Lockheed is a subcontractor, the Air Force
through its established procedures has negotiated a settlement with
Boeing (the prime contractor). Twenty million dollars was paid in
full settlement of the $54 million claim which Boeing submitted on
behalf of Lockheed. This settlement specifically provided that the
entire $20 million would be applied to increase the ceiling price of
Lockheed's subcontract. This problem can therefore be considered
resolved.
Ship claims of $46 million for work under five completed contracts were
settled for $17.9 million in June of 1970. This settlement was reached
through the established procedures for negotiating ship claims. The
remaining claims, totaling $159. 8 million, have been the subject of
intensive negotiations between the Navy and Lockheed. To settle these
claims, the Navy has offered Lockheed $58 million. I am hopeful that
a settlement of these claims can be reached. Generally speaking, all
negotiations regarding this program have also been concluded. The
single remaining issue is Lockheed's acceptance of this offer.
The two remaining issues, therefore, are the Cheyenne program for
the Army and the C-5A for the Air Force.
With regard to the Cheyenne program, it is my decision that it is in
the best interest of the government to complete the development effort
so that we can determine whether the Cheyenne will be a viable candidate
to provide close air support for the Army, and so that we can realize
some value for the investment we have already made. The ceiling
price of the existing contract is approximately $95 million, of which
about $90 million had already been disbursed by the Army. In an
attempt to complete the development program, Lockheed has expended
to date substantially more than the ceiling price and about $100 million
more than it has been reimbursed. We believe that a realigned develop-
ment program can be completed largely within the next year, but we
have concluded that the company lacks the capacity to finance this
program to a point of completion satisfactory for the Army to determine
the aircraft system feasibility.
For this reason, we propose to convert the Cheyenne research and
development contract to a cost reimbursement form effective as of
December 29, 1969. The designation of the effective date is based
upon an evaluation of all the relevant factors bearing on the program
and upon analysis of Lockheed's overall financial condition, as shown
by data received from Lockheed to date. Under this arrangement, the
Army will assume future costs of the program and will reimburse
Lockheed for approximately $25 million in costs which have been incurred
on the development program since December 29, 1969.
The Cheyenne production "letter contract" which was executed by the
Army in January 1968, and terminated for default in May 1969, is now
in the early stages of litigation. Lockheed's costs for this phase of the
program approximate $98 million against which they received $53. 8
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million from the Army in progress payments prior to default. Suppliers
and subcontractors for the Cheyenne production program have submitted
settlement proposals in excess of $84 million.
We have decided to settle the Cheyenne production contract by authorizing
the Army to pay $36 million or the actual amount of the settlement of the
claims of unpaid suppliers and subcontracts under this letter contract,
whichever is lesser. The settlement agreement will include controls
and audit procedures to assure that any funds actually paid will be
used solely for this purpose. The Army will audit and monitor the
settlement of the claims of suppliers and subcontractors before payment.
Lockheed, pursuant to this settlement, will have to agree to withdraw
from litigation their related claim now before the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals.
On the C-5A program I have, after the most careful consideration of all
relevant factors, narrowed the range for resolution to two alternatives.
1. One alternative is to reduce the number of peripheral issues in
dispute by negotiation and to allow the core of the disagreements to
proceed through litigation. The litigation would be basically
concerned, therefore, with the question of whether the Air Force
exercised an option for 81 airplanes or for 115 airplanes and the
corresponding application of the repricing formula. The Air Force
and Lockheed, over several weeks of discussion, have concluded
that the litigable disagreements would result in a financial range
from approximately a plus $25 million recovery by Lockheed against
the United States to about $480 million liability or loss by Lockheed.
2. The other alternative would settle the entire dispute by eliminating
all issues and imposing a fixed loss on Lockheed. In addition, such
a settlement would preclude any performance incentive fees, or
profits on initial spares and on added work related to the scope of
the contract which Lockheed otherwise might have earned.
Our analysis of Lockheed's financial situation has led us to the conclusion
that after the Air Force has paid Lockheed up to the Air Force's
interpretation of ceiling price, the company will lack the funds or
resources to finance continued production of the C-5A program. More-
over, under either alternative we must achieve a workable contractual
arrangement which will permit the Air Force a more active role in
management of the program. Also, under either alternative, it will
be necessary for the Air Force to provide all the funds to complete the
C-5A program. (Although, under the first alternative a portion may--
and under the second alternative a portion would--be repayable to the
Air Force. ) In any event, stipulations under either alternative would
include a repayment provision and interest charges on the unpaid
balances, with an acceleration clause in the event of initiation of
bankruptcy.
A fixed loss settlement alternative would remove once and for all the
contentions of both parties. Such fixed settlement loss would consist
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entirely of "allowable" costs, and would be above and in addition to
losses due to certain costs incurred by the" contractor which are
neither allowed nor paid by the government. (These costs, referred
to an "unallowables, " are projected by Lockheed to exceed $40 million
on this program. In addition, payments to Lockheed will exclude
otherwise allowable costs to the extent such costs fall in the four
numbered categories listed in Section 504(b) of the Department of
Defense Procurement and Research Authorization Act, 1971 (P. L. 91-441).
In determining the dollar amount of the fixed loss that should be the
basis for the settlement of the C-5A dispute, I took all relevant factors
into consideration. Among the factors considered in arriving at this
figure were the range of financial results which would result from the
litigation, the apparent weight of the legal arguments of the parties on
the issues in dispute and Lockheed's potential ability to respond to
a judgment in favor of the United States, should one result. After
weighing all the many complex factors, a $200 million figure represents
my best judgment. I do not expect it to meet with unanimous endorse-
ment; some will think it too low, others too high- -but it remains my
best judgment after months of consideration of what is without doubt
the most complex management and contractual dispute I or any of the
principals ever have encountered.
After weighing both of these alternatives I have concluded that the fixed
loss settlement alternative is preferable. It has the advantage of
finality, and would facilitate management improvements in the remainder
of the program. I recognize the possibility that Lockheed may decline
to settle for this fixed loss and prefer litigation.
As I mentioned earlier, Lockheed's latest financial information is being
compiled and will be audited by the Defense Contract Audit Agency. We
have also asked that the General Accounting Office review this data
with us prior to the execution of our decisions.
The $200 million "contingency" fund, which we have requested to be
authorized and appropriated for FY 1971 for the C-5A, will necessarily
be utilized to continue the production of the aircraft beginning in
February, and will be expended in the context of the settlement
outlined above.
We are aware that the course of action which we propose to follow does
not guarantee that bankruptcy of Lockheed is precluded; nevertheless,
this course is, in our opinion, the necessary one based on the national
defense interest. The uncertainty exists because overall financial
stability of Lockheed is contingent not only on the financing of its
defense programs, but also on further financial support from the




Our actions in settling the disputes on the four defense programs will
resolve contingent liabilities of Lockheed and, we hope, thereby
provide a degree of certainty to the overall financial affairs of
Lockheed that will permit the banks to continue to finance the commercial
programs, and avoid bankruptcy. I will continue to closely monitor
the financial and management situation of Lockheed as these plans are
implemented. It is also my intent to insure that all possible controls
are exercised by Defense over our financial relationships with Lockheed
to assure the satisfactory performance on Defense programs and the
protection of Defense interests.
This summarizes the alternatives and the action we intend to take to
resolve these very difficult contractual matters. The final details of
the settlement and the documents necessary to implement this plan are
now being prepared, and will be completed by the end of January 1971.
I will be available to review this plan in detail with your Committee






IE. LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION:
CAPITAL CASE
A. THE SITUATION
In 1966 Lockheed Aircraft Corporation was riding high in the
aerospace industry. The company was in an exceptionally sound
financial position. Net earnings for the year amounted to $59 million
on sales of $2.1 billion. Stockholders 1 equity was $318 million and
supported long term debt of only $17 million. This debt was in the
form of 4 1/2 % debentures due in 1976. The company was providing
$1. 9 million per year for the retirement of these debentures. At
this time, Lockheed was the nations's leading defense contractor. The
previous year, the company had won a $1.9 billion contract to develop
and produce the C-5A transport for the Air Force. If Lockheed
could keep costs on the C-5A within contractual limits, it stood to
gain before-tax profits of approximately $200 million in the next eight
years.
By the end of 1972 Lockheed's financial position had changed
drastically. Company operations for the period 1967 through 1972
had resulted in a net profit of only $11.6 million. During this time '
period Lockheed sustained pretax losses of $484 million on four major
defense contracts. In 1971 the government passed the Emergency
Loan Guarantee Act. Under this act, the government guaranteed
loans of up to $250 million for Lockheed. These loans kept the company
out of receivership. In 1972, long term debt for the corporation




B. LOCKHEED OPERATIONS, 1967-1969
In 1967, Lockheed dealt almost exclusively in defense contracting.
During this period the company started to have financial difficulties
with four major defense contracts. Three of these contracts, the
C-5A Galaxy, the AH-56A Cheyenne helicopter and a motor for the
Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM), had been awarded under a new
concept known as "total package procurement" or TPP. The fourth
contract was for Naval ship construction and was a fixed-price
incentive type contract. Under TPP, the contractor submitted a
fixed price for a total program through development and production.
Each contract contained a ceiling price, which limited government
liability to that amount. Any cost overruns in excess of the ceiling
price were to be borne by the contractor. TPP projects were funded
by progress payments from the government to the contractor as work
progressed. The top limit for progress payments was normally set
at 90% of the ceiling price.
Excessive cost overruns were encountered on all four programs.
Prior to 1969, Lockheed had absorbed losses on these contracts of
$140 million before taxes. In 1969 the company wrote off an additional
$150 million on the programs, with a resultant net loss to the company
of $32. 6 million. In spite of these write-offs, Lockheed and the
government were in disagreement over an additional $1 billion in
cost overruns by the end of 1969.
In 1967 Lockheed management made the decision to diversify
their operations. The new venture into the field of commercial
aviation was the L-1011 TriStar. Since the company would not receive
progress payments for the TriStar, as they were accustomed to under
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defense contracts, new funding was necessary. In March 1967, a
4 1/4 % convertible subordinated debenture issue for $125 million
was registered by Lockheed. Beginning in 1978, the company would
be required to provide approximately $6 million annually for a sinking
fund to retire these debentures if the total amount was still outstanding.
Further financing was obtained from airline advance payments. By
the end of 1969, Lockheed had firm orders for 102 L-lOlls. Gross
inventories on the program were $292 million of which $114 million
represented advance payments. In 1968 and 1969 the company charged
a total of $37.5 million of general and administrative L-1011 expenses
to earnings as the aircraft moved into major assembly.
During 1969, the company began to feel the unpleasant effects of
a cash shortage as capital was siphoned from the company to support
the overrun defense contracts. To ease the strain, the company
arranged with 24 banks for an unsecured line of credit for $400 million.
All notes under this agreement were to mature in 1971 and bore
interest at the prime commercial bank rate. At the end of 1971,
Lockheed would have the option to obtain a loan of up to $400 million
to be repaid in eight equal installments over a four year period. By
the end of 1969, the company had drawn the line of credit down to
$200 million.
C. LOCKHEED OPERATIONS, 1970 AND 1971
In early 1970, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation could foresee a
serious cash shortage. The $400 million line of credit, intended to
finance the L-1011, had been drawn down to $80 million. Of the $320
million borrowed, $170 million had been diverted from the TriStar
program to support the troubled defense contracts. The company
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lacked adequate funding from current assets and projected income to
fund either the L-1011 or the defense contracts. Lockheed was
staring bankruptcy in the face. In a desperate attempt to obtain
additional capital, Lockheed appealed to the Department of Defense
for relief. The company requested $650 million in immediate funding,
pending settlement of the disputed contracts. In late 1970, the SRAM
contractual dispute was settled through negotiation. Lockheed
accepted $20 million in lieu of its claim for $54 million that the
company felt was necessary to complete SRAM development.
While awaiting an answer from the Department of Defense, the
company turned again to the banking community. The $400 million
line of credit was rearranged to provide a secured line for $500
million. This gave Lockheed only $30 million in immediate cash.
The remaining $150 million was to be retained by the banks until
such time as the government and Lockheed were able to resolve
their differences.
On 27 January 1971, Lockheed received a final answer from the
Defense Department in the form of an ultimatum. In his letter,
Deputy Defense Secretary said in part:
. . .1 have found that there is no precedent in the Department
of Defense for advancing funds beyond those specified in a contract
during the course of litigation between the contracting parties. . . .
I have determined. . . .the Department of Defense could not agree
to payments to Lockheed in excess of the ceiling on the contract
during the litigation or to restructure the existing contract.
In prior correspondence with Lockheed, Mr. Packard had
offered the company $62 million in full settlement for outstanding
ship construction claims of $160 million. He had also proposed to
restructure the Cheyenne contract to a cost reimbursable contract,
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contingent on Lockheed accepting a loss of $120 million on the program.
In regards to the C-5A contract, Mr. Packard had offered Lockheed
two alternatives. The first was to settle the dispute through litigation.
Discussion between the Air Force and Lockheed indicated that the
company would earn $25 million if all disputed points were settled
in favor of Lockheed. If all issues were decided against Lockheed,
the company would incur, in addition to previous losses on the
program, a loss of $480 million. The second alternative would
impose a fixed loss of $200 million on the company. Under either
alternative, Mr. Packard had indicated that the government would
continue to fund the program to completion.
Lockheed agreed with the proposed shipbuilding and Cheyenne
settlements. Prior to receiving Mr. Packard's final letter, the
company had intended to pursue the C-5A contractual dispute through
the courts. Now, Lockheed was backed into a corner. With no
additional bank financing available, the company would not be able
to fund the C-5A program through a lengthy court battle. The
company had no reasonable alternative but to accept the fixed loss.
The company forfeited $100 million that it had already expended on
the program. The remaining $100 million was to be repaid, with
interest, in ten annual installments beginning in 1974. Lockheed
wrote off all the losses, except the deferred $100 million, against
1970 earnings. This resulted in a net loss for the year of $86 million.
The following week, Lockheed was dealt another stunning blow.
Rolls Royce, the contractor for the L-1011 engines, had been forced
into receivership. The company had several alternatives for
obtaining new engines. The most feasible of these was to negotiate
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with the British government. In the end, Lockheed paid $260, 000
more per engine, waived any penalty payments for late delivery, and
accepted an engine with lower performance than originally specified.
Although a new contract for the engines had been arranged, the fate
of Lockheed was still in the hands of the government. The banks
were refusing to advance the company additional funds without
governmental guarantee of the loans.
This guarantee was in the form of legislation introduced before
Congress in the spring of 1971. Known as the Emergency Loan
Guarantee Act, it was to apply to all corporations having serious
financial difficulties. Both critics and advocates of the bill realized
that it was a way for the government to bail Lockheed out of trouble.
After heated debate, the act was passed into law. In qualifying for
the maximum $250 million loan guarantee, the company had provided
Congress with 5 year projections on funds flow, income statements
and balance sheets. These projections, shown in Exhibits 1 through
3, were intended to show how Lockheed could meet their financial
obligations through 1975.
Throughout 1971, Lockheed had been working on a $750 million
financial agreement. The new agreement consisted of $400 million
already borrowed from 24 banks, $250 million guaranteed by the
U. S. government and $100 million in additional prepayments from
the airlines on L-1011 orders. The guaranteed loans were revolving
nine-month notes bearing an interest rate 5/8 of a percent above
the prime rate plus a guarantee fee of 2. 37c. The non-guaranteed
$400 million were ninety-day credit notes with an interest rate of
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prime plus three quarters of a percent. The $100 million in prepay-
ments also bore interest at the prime rate.
As 1971 came to an end, Lockheed had long term debt outstanding
of $707 million. The gross TriStar inventories had risen to $1,027
million which included $286 million in airline advances. Charges
against income for the year were $38 million for L-1011 general and
administrative expenses and $42 million in disruption costs caused
by the bankruptcy of Rolls Royce. Comparable general and adminis-
trative charges in 1970 were $42 million.
Sales for the year included $1. 33 billion for military contracts
which now allowed zero profit.
D. LOCKHEED OPERATIONS, 1972
During 1972 Lockheed delivered the first L- 101 Is. Only 17
aircraft were delivered instead of the scheduled 21, due to engine and
production difficulties. These problems had been overcome but
costs for the program were higher than anticipated. L-1011 sales
amounted to $300 million. All TriStar deliveries were costed at an
amount equal to revenues and provided no profit. Additional write-
offs on the program totaled $80. 5 million in 1972. Gross TriStar
inventories stood at $1, 389 million and included $330 million of
normal advances and $100 million of interest bearing prepayments.
In order to break even on the L-1011 program, the company needed
to sell at least 300 TriStars. By the end of the year, orders had
stagnated at 117 firm (including the 17 delivered) and 82 tentative.
The future sales outlook for the airplane was not bright. Long term
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debt for the company stood at an all time high of $760 million. A
breakdown of this debt, extracted from the 1972 Lockheed annual
report, has been reproduced in Exhibit 4.
E. LOCKHEED'S FUTURE?
Sales to the government during 1972 amounted to 75% of total
sales. Due to increased TriStar sales, Lockheed predicted that
this percentage would steadily decrease. (See Exhibit I.) Military
sales of $250 million were carried at no profit in 1972. These
profitless sales were estimated to be $120 million in 1973 and zero
thereafter.
All L-1011 deliveries will be costed at amounts equal to revenues
through 1975. The $100 million in interest bearing advances were
scheduled to be liquidated through deliveries by 1976. Due to ctist
increases, general and administrative expenses for the TriStar
program were revised by Lockheed to $70 million in 1.973, $55 million
in 1974 and $45 million in 1975.
Comparative financial reports and data for the Lockheed





Consolidated Earnings: Financial Forecast
(in millions of dollars)





738 1825 1351 1513 1511
88 182 162 124 109
151 576 984 1234 1484
Total 2977 2583 2497 2871 3104



















Total 54 75 81 95 107

















Balance Sheet: Financial Forecast
($ in millions)
Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Assets:
Current Assets:
Cash and securities 50 52 53 49 51
Accounts receivable-net 163 154 • 149 152 146
Inventories -net (note 1) 882 933 874 783 542
Prepaid expenses 28 33 . 36 34 30
Total 1123 1172 1112 1018 771
Fixed Assets (note 2) 343 317 303 293 285
Customer notes recv. - - 35 75 100
Other assets 4 4 7 9 11




Accounts payable 195 174 168 190 186
Income tax - - - - 10
Deferred income tax 45 60 75 100 90
Retirement plan 67 67 63 62 58
Salaries and wages 81 69 66 65 67
Other liabilities 63 52 55 60 60
Total current liabilities 451 422 427 477 470
Long-term borrowings 510 550 495 370 120
Notes payable-plant B-l 27 25 23 21 19
C-5A liability 100 100 100 90 80
Debentures 132 130 128 127 125
Stockholders' equity 250 266 284 310 352
Total 1470 1493 1457 1395 1167
Stockholders' equity:
Capital stock 11 11 11 11 11
Additional capital 79 79 79 79 79
Retained earnings 159 176 194 220 262
Note 1:
Progress payments 219 180 249 244 253
Commercial deposits 402 502 402 309 116
Note 2. Accumulated deprec-




Source and Disposition of Consolidated Working
Capital: Financial Forecast
(in millions of dollars)
Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975"
Source of capital:
Earnings 14.9 16.3 17.6 27.1 41.1
Depreciation and
amortization 61.1 55.9 51.4 48.3 47.7
Amortization of debenture
expense .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
Borrowing 160.0 65.0
Long term note -Plant B-l 27.0 -
Reduction in receivables - - - 2.. 5 9.5
Book value of assets sold 3.6 .8 2.7 .6 .6
Total 266.7 138.1 71.8 78.6 99.0
Disposition of working capital:
Fixed asset additions 62.5 31.4 39.1 39.9 39.9
Reduction in 4 1/4 %o
debentures 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9
Reduction in borrowing - 25.0 55.0 125.0 250.0
Reduction in note-Plant B-l - 2.2 1.8 1.8 1.8
Reduction in C-5A facility - - -- 10.0 10.0
Increase in notes receivable - - 35.0 42.5 34.5
Increase (decrease) in
other assets (2.0) 1.1 2.7 2.2 2.0
Total 62.4 61. 6 135.4 223.3 340.1
Increase (decrease) in
working capital 204.3 76.5 (63.6) (144.7) (241.1)
Working capital at
beginning of period 468.5 672.8 749.3 685.7 541.0
Working capital at




1972 Long Term Debt
($ in thousands)
Notes payable to banks under
the 1971 credit agreement $400,000
Guaranteed notes 130, 000
Deferred liability to
the U. S. Government - 100,000
4 1/2 % debentures -due in
three equal installments 5, 625
4 1/4 % debentures 125,000
$760, 625
The 1971 Credit Agreement provides for $400 million of revolving
ninety-day credit notes and $250 million of revolving nine-month
guaranteed notes. A guarantee fee is paid to the U. S. Government
with respect to the guaranteed notes. Interest rates under the
agreement fluctuate with specified market indicators (the prime rate
and Treasury bills). At February 28, 1973, the effective interest
cost, including the guarantee fee, was 7.36%.
Maximum permitted borrowings under the 1971 credit agreement
are $650 million, decreasing to $630 million on June 30, 1973, to
$595 million on December 31, 1973, and to $470 million on
December 31, 1974. The Credit Agreement terminates on
December 31, 1975.
Under the 1971 Credit Agreement, the capital stock of five of the
company's consolidated subsidiaries and certain equipment are
pledged as security for the notes and the company's 4 1/2 % debentures,
The net assets of the pledged subsidiaries aggregate $214, 272, 000
at December 31, 197 2, including property, plant and equipment having
a depreciated cost of $176,359,000. Other pledged equipment had
a depreciated cost of $34 million.
The deferred liability is payable commencing in 1974 in annual
amounts which shall be the greater of $10 million or 10% of the
preceding year's pretax income with interest accruing from January 1,
1974 at the prime commercial bank rate. The deferred liability is
secured with a lien on property, plant and equipment at Marietta,
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